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ABSTRACT 
 
Beyond actual institutional influences, entrepreneurs’ perceptions of institutions 
and their potential inconsistencies in interpreting institutional change may influence 
entrepreneurial intent to quit a business. Especially at the microentrepreneurial level, 
inconsistencies in perceptions of institutional change may variously affect individuals’ 
intent to abandon their business, seek jobs in other sectors, or even continue in business 
despite regulatory institutional changes making their business legally untenable. Our goal 
in this research is to empirically measure these intents in the face of inconsistent 
perceptions of institutional change with a sample of 660 street vendors from different 
cities in Vietnam. We find that perception of the two theoretical constructs, actions as 
rules and diminished utility of regulatory control, are negatively correlated with intent to 
quit a business, which is consistent with our hypotheses. Contrary to what we 
hypothesized, however, microentrepreneurial intent to exit their business is positively 
correlated with perceptions of retrospective legitimization. Implications for future 
research and public policy are also discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Walking down the bustling streets in Vietnam’s big cities, one is likely to see 
street vendors wearing the cone shaped non la (leaf hat), pushing carts or carrying 
shoulder poles with baskets containing a wide range of items from prepared snack food, 
to fresh fruits, vegetables, meat, fish and many more. Buying and selling on Vietnam’s 
city streets is part of Vietnamese culture (Dana, 1994). This type of retailing has thrived 
because it satisfies Vietnamese consumers’ needs. It is fast; it is easy; and it adds the 
convenience of being right at the doorsteps.  
As Vietnam transitions from a controlled market toward a more open market, 
institutional changes have had substantial impacts on the many businesses of street 
vendors— the quintessential microentrepreneurs of Vietnamese culture. However, in an 
attempt to create a modern look for big cities, the Vietnamese government has tried to 
clear streets by imposing a ban on streets vending. In addition, Vietnamese consumers are 
changing their shopping habits toward more Western means of retail distribution favoring 
modern shopping outlets such as Big C or Metro Cash and Carry (Lincoln, 2008; Jensen 
& Peppard, 2007).  
Further, WTO membership requires that Vietnam gradually open its markets to 
international players. Regulations in the retailing industry have been loosened to 
encourage foreign investors to enter the market but tightened to reduce the number of 
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street vendors to create a more “Western look” for Vietnamese cities. While street 
vending has, at least, in part continued, it is now done in a less favorable institutional 
environment. We explore in this research whether multilevel institutional changes (Seo & 
Creed, 2002) have affected street vendors’ intentions to stay in the business or to switch 
to other occupations. In fact, beyond actual institutional influences, microentrepreneurs’ 
perceptions of institutions and potential institutional inconsistencies (Seo & Creed, 2002) 
may influence these microentrepreneurs’ quit intentions. Inconsistencies in perceptions of 
institutional change may variously affect individuals’ intent to abandon their business or 
even continue in business despite regulatory institutional changes making their business 
legally untenable.  
Our goal in this research is to measure these sociocognitive intentions 
(Gustafsson, 2009) in the face of inconsistent perceptions of institutional change (Seo & 
Creed, 2002). This blending of micro-level entrepreneurialism with macro-level 
institutional data provides a rich theoretical context that enhances the multifaceted 
theoretical context faced by microentrepreneurs and provides a more nuanced answer to 
our research question. In addition, this micro-macro approach treads the ground from 
micro-focused organization behavior as such as microentrepreneurs’ intent to quit to 
theory typically used to explain the bases of compliance and order, mechanisms, logics, 
indicators, and bases of legitimacy of institutional features of national importance (Scott 
& Davis, 2007, p. 258-261). By blending these two seemingly disparate literatures, we 
believe we can test some novel questions. Indeed, the three contructs that are at the root 
of our hypotheses—actions as rules, retrospective legitimization, and diminished utility 
of administrative controls—have never been tested empirically. Although they emerged 
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from the in-depth qualitative work of Droege and Brown-Johnson (2007) for the action as 
rules and retrospective legitimization contructs and the Droege and Marvel (2010) 
qualitative construct of diminished utility of administrative controls, our research is the 
first to empirically test these qualitatively-derived constructs. 
The next section will present the conceptual background for our research question 
and hypotheses. We then report our results using scales drawn from the meso-
institutional theory literature (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007, Droege & Marvel, 2010). 
Our scales measured perceived changes in Vietnam’s institutional environment; we then 
use these microentrepreneurs’ intents to react in the face of these perceived institutional 
changes in light of correlations and multiple regression to dig out the nuances that may 
have been hidden or gone unrecognized in the original qualitative data. Following this, 
we (1) explain how our results extend extant institutional theoretical perspectives, (2) 
infer potential public policy implications these perspectives may have going forward in 
Vietnam’s efforts toward perceived economic progress, and (3) draw conclusions based 
on our findings.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
Microentrepreneurial facets of street vending belong to the informal sector of a 
society’s economic activities. These microentrepreneurs consist of enterprises that 
usually are unregistered, operated by individuals or families, do not generate any taxes, 
and consist of persons who cannot secure regular employment (Woodworth, 2000). 
Although some regard this type of microentrepreneurship as a gray market distinguished 
by “disguised unemployment” (Harris & Todaro, 1970), others affirm that street vending 
is a vital means in helping the poor feed their families and sustain day-by-day survival 
(Tinker, 1997). It is worth noting that street vending is not just a temporary, spontaneous 
business practice. Street vendors use the same mechanics as other business activities. 
They raise capital through various institutional arrangements. They develop and make 
innovations in selling techniques. They try to protect the property that they informally 
acquired (Jaffe, Carciente, & Zanoni, 2007). In short, they are institutional entrepreneurs 
(Droege & Marvel, 2010), those whose en masse methods are serendipitously brought 
together through individualistic needs for survival as they assail the boundaries of formal 
institutional norms (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007) and where dialectic processes 
mitigate the pressures between institutionalization and de-institutionalization (Koane, 
2006). This is a typical institutional route taken despite its seeming lack of efficiency 
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(Selznick, 1984) when bridges are still being build between former and emerging 
institutions (Oliver, 1992). 
The informal economic activities of street vendors are conducted both in 
developed and developing countries (Bromley, 2000). For examples, New York City now 
houses about 12,557 street vendors (The Street Vendor Project, 2006). These 
microentrepreneurs come from a variety of backgrounds including Chinese, Senegalese, 
Bangladeshi, Egyptian, Afghani, Mexican, Russian, and many other ethnicities (The 
Street Vendor Project, 2006). Street vending is highly regulated in New York City with 
rules governing types of goods, locations, operating hours, and licensing. Although such 
regulations makes it easier for the government to control the number of street vendors 
and their practices, the cap on the number of street permits restricts the number of want-
to-be street vendors. The number of migrants—which constitutes the majority of street 
vendors in New York City— who want to street vend far exceeds the number of permits 
issued. Also, the complex system of regulations and restrictions enforced by seven 
different city agencies makes gray market street vending more difficult than in emerging 
markets with less formalized institutional frameworks.  
From an emerging market perspective, street vending in Mexico City, Mexico, for 
example, is not regulated directly by the local government; instead, there are vendor 
organizations to help street vendors deal with bureaucracies and help settle conflicts 
among vendors (Crossa, 2009; Menocal, 1998). In Kumba, the largest town in the 
Southwest province in Cameroon, however, vendors do not have any organizations to 
regulate or manage their activities. This informal sector in the economy of Kumba, 
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although providing an important means of supporting the poor’s life, received little 
formal institutional support from the government due to the many associated street 
vending problems such as traffic congestion and street cluttering. Local government has 
recently changed regulations from banning street vending activities to helping street 
vendors with food safety and vendor health information (Acho-Chi, 2002), a clear 
example of the negotiated structuration of institutionalization (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) 
and negotiated boundaries of institutional space (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007). Street 
vendors in Vietnam are now facing the same situation that vendors in Kumba were in 
(Acho-Chi, 2002), providing support for the statement that microentrepreneurialism is a 
global phenomenon (Chossudovsky, 1998) but that its particular local character is path 
dependent (Sydow, Schreyögg & Koch, 2009), on national institutional culture (Hayton, 
George & Zahra, 2002) with national institutions having predominant effects even over 
local cultural adaptation (Tan, 2002). 
Vietnamese Street Vendors and Institutional Interference 
Street vending represents a small yet highly visible part of the Vietnamese 
economy and plays an important role in the life of many poor people (Lincoln, 2008). 
This informal economy of Vietnam provides a diverse portfolio of products and employs 
a significant portion of workers. The goods that street vendors sell vary from prepared 
foods to fresh produce and other household tools. Contrary to the demographics of New 
York street vendors who were generally male and well-educated (The Street Vendor 
Project, 2006), Vietnamese participants in the street vendor sector were mainly 
uneducated and rural women (Lincoln, 2008). Most of the workers came to bigger cities 
7 
 
with the hope of changing their life. Jensen and Peppard (2007) recognized that street 
vendors left their small towns because the incomes their families earned from farming 
were inadequate. However, because these rural-to-urban immigrants lack the necessary 
education and skills to find a job in the formal sector, they end up becoming vendors on 
streets—jobs requiring little formal education or skills. Although the income they earn 
from selling food and other items on the streets is not very high, it is enough for them to 
make contributions to their families.  
Vietnamese local governments, however, look at street vending in a different way. 
They see street vending as “pre-modern, undisciplined urban commercial patterns” 
(Lincoln, 2008, p. 263). Stricter policies have been enforced in an attempt to resolve 
street vending related problems such as traffic jams, reduced food safety, visual pollution, 
and environmental pollution (SBTN, 2008). Regulations have been imposed to limit the 
activities of street vending in areas proximate to of tourists attractions or government 
buildings (SBTN, 2008). Street vendors inappropriately approaching, following, and 
begging visitors to buy goods from tourists has created negative images for tourist 
destination cities. Moreover, field observations reveal that even on streets that are not 
listed as street vending free zones, the police still have the authority to confiscate street 
vendors if they see the potential of these vending businesses to generate crowds. The 
government also refers to public health concerns as a reason for the elimination of 
vending on streets. Street foods and roadside restaurants are cited to be principal sources 
of contagion of public health diseases. Some sources, however, pinpointed that in such 
big cities as Ha Noi, it was the antiquated sewer system and the lack of water treatment 
facilities that were to blame for the outbreak of public contamination (Lincoln, 2008). In 
8 
 
his book Wards of Hanoi, Koh describes the government’s effort to enforce order on the 
streets in 1983, 1986, 1991 and 1995 (2005). In July 2008, in an attempt to beautify the 
city and improve urban sanitation, food hygiene, and traffic congestion, Ha Noi’s city 
government announced a partial ban on street vendors and sidewalk-based commerce. 
According to the ban, street businesses in some streets and areas would be forbidden 
(Lincoln, 2008). The Peoples’ Committee of Da Nang City also had plans to control the 
activities of street vendors. Vending is banned on main streets such as Bach Dang, Tran 
Phu, and Le Duan. Street vendors are also not allowed in some strategic areas such as 
Cham Museum or March 29 Square (The People Committee of Da Nang City, 2006). The 
reason is because most of the government buildings are concentrated in these areas. Also, 
these are also popular tourist attractions. In addition, because the number of people from 
rural to urban locales has increased rapidly in recent years, the government has 
encountered difficulty in controlling and managing rural-to-urban migrants, the majority 
of whom become street vendors soon after arriving (Asian Development Bank, 2007).  
Increasingly Competitive Business Environment  
Traditional street markets are the most common type of retailing in Vietnam. 
Jensen and Peppard’s (2007) study reveals that traditional markets were very important to 
Vietnamese consumers. Results from their survey show that, on average, virtually all of 
the interviewed shoppers went to traditional markets 362 times a year. Besides, Vietnam 
joined the WTO in 2007, which makes it easier for foreign retailers to enter the market. 
According to 2009 A.T. Kearney Global Retail Development Index, although Vietnam 
topped the index in 2008, now stands in 6th place in term of retail development potential 
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among emerging economies. The country now has about 400 supermarkets and 2,000 
convenience stores operating by both domestic and global companies. Many global 
retailers are established in Vietnam including South Korea’s Lotte, Japan’s Seiyu, 
Malaysia’s Parkson, Thailland’s Big C, Hong Kong’s Dairy Farm, Thailand’s CP All and 
Germany’s Metro Cash and Carry. It is expected that more international retailers will be 
entering the maker in the next few years (Nielsen, 2009). Nielsen Retail Audit reveals 
that the number of modern retail trade outlets in Vietnam increased by 16 per cent from 
2007 to 2008. Also, the central Vietnamese authorities have been introducing new 
policies favoring international players. On January 1, 2009, the Vietnamese government 
allowed 100 percent foreign owned retailers to set up. Earlier this year, January 2010, the 
door to the entire Vietnamese retail industry is completely open. Foreign traders are now 
allowed to execute all kinds of wholesale and retail business in Vietnam (Nielsen, 2009) 
but are still banned from traditional state owned business which tend to related to 
infrastructure, oil, banking, and similar industries that are more given to wild swings in 
price that, at this time, the Vietnamese government would be more comfortable 
controlling.  
Supermarket chains such as Big C from Thailand and Metro Cash and Carry from 
Germany have entered the market and are expanding their operations. They provide the 
Vietnamese consumers with modern, Western-styled shopping experiences. These big 
supermarkets serve as one-stop shopping sites. Products are presented in an eye catching 
way and offered at fixed prices as opposed to the negotiation typical of buying from 
street vendors. Customers are also exposed to wider and deeper assortments of 
merchandise. These new stores, although still constituting a small fraction of the retail 
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industry, are gaining an increasing number of customers and growing at a rapid pace. 
These foreign competitors have put street vendors in a different and harder environment 
than they were before. In addition, fast-food chains such as the Philippines Jollibee, 
Korean Lotteria and U.S.-based Pizza Hut (part of Yum! Brands) are penetrating the 
Vietnamese market, posing significant threat to street food vendors. These foreign-based 
restaurants bring new tastes to Vietnamese dining and claim to provide guaranteed 
quality. New food items offered in modern dining rooms where young people or families 
can sit down and enjoy a meal with their friends are something that Vietnamese street 
vendors simply cannot offer.  
Consumer’s Changing Shopping Behavior 
Traditional markets, street vendors, and mom-and-pop stores are no longer the 
only options available to Vietnamese consumers. The new wave of incoming modern 
shopping centers has offered shoppers new alternatives. Consumers now shop at 
supermarkets such as Big C more often and spend more money there. They believe they 
have access to higher quality items at supermarkets. Jensen and Peppard (2007) published 
an interesting study about the Vietnamese consumers’ attitudes towards street vendors 
given the introduction of large retailers. The study shows that roaming vendors are at a 
disadvantage compared to other retail forms. For example, the quality of goods from 
street vendors was rated poor; 44 per cent of the interviewees complained about the lack 
of freshness and the uncertainty about the origin of the goods.  
Besides, consumers go to supermarkets so that they do not have to deal with the 
hassle of bargaining at traditional markets or on streets. Life is going at a faster pace, 
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making time and convenience increasingly valued in Vietnamese culture. Moreover, the 
young generations of Vietnam are vulnerable to new trends coming from outside, 
especially Western styles. Their shopping habits are different from those of their parents 
or grandparents. They are interested in new styles and enjoy the comfort and modern feel 
that fast-food restaurants and supermarkets offer. Even older generations with increasing 
purchasing power favor shopping at big retail stores that offer a one-stop shopping 
experience. According to the World Bank (2009), Vietnam has recently enjoyed an 
increase in GNI per capita from US$770 to US$890, an increase of about 16 percent. The 
rate of poor households decreased from 13.4% in 2008 to 12.3% in 2009 (The World 
Bank, 2009). 
In conclusion, although representing a significant part of the Vietnamese informal 
economy, street vendors are now fighting a harder battle than they were previously with 
little institutional support. Regulations are becoming stricter; competition is more intense, 
there are newer, more reliable, and more convenient types of retailing and consumers are 
changing their shopping habits in favor of modern outlets.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Much of the intent literature in entrepreneurship “refers to the intention of an 
individual to start a new business” (Engle et al., 2010, p. 38) and the many factors that 
influence such entrepreneurial intentions including motives, attitudes, and behaviors as 
captured in the entrepreneurial orientation construct (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) or success 
predictors such as adaptive and generative learning as captured in the learning orientation 
construct (Senge, 1990). These types of constructs have sometimes been combined in 
12 
 
efforts to better understand firm performance such as Wang’s (2008) research providing 
evidence that learning orientation mediates between entrepreneurial orientation and firm 
performance. Choo and Wong (2006) studied the key motives as well as barriers to 
starting a business among mid-career individuals using data from military officers from 
the Singapore Armed Forces. Liñán and Chen’s (2009) recent research used the 
Entrepreneurial Intention Questionnaire (EIQ) to test an individual’s intention of starting 
a business in Spain or Taiwan using attitude toward start-up, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavior control. In addition, although an individual’s drive and commitment 
plays an important role in setting up a business, Smallbone and Welter (2001) have 
mentioned how social, economic, political and institutional environments dominantly 
influence the creation of new businesses. 
Our research, however, looks at the other side of the question: Do perceptions of 
changing institutions influence microentrepreneurs to quit? That is, rather than 
considering the intent to form a business, do certain institutional characteristics correlate 
with the intent to quit a microenterprise?   
Meso-Institutional Impact on Microentrepreneurial Intent to Quit 
Although the extent of institutional effects are likely to vary depending on a 
nation’s market reform stages particularly in transitional economies along with various, 
cultural influences and path dependent historical values, empirical evidence suggests 
small enterprises still develop despite hostile and unstable national institutional cultures 
during market reforms (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). Scott (2008, p. 48) defines 
institutions as “regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with 
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associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.” Each 
institutional element—regulative, cultural-cognitive, and normative—has different effects 
on social behaviors and economic activities. Entrepreneurship is certainly not immune 
from this influence. It is worth noting that institutional factors, rather than being stable, 
experience changes over time (Scott, 2008). Such changes can be observed in transition 
countries such as Vietnam, which is moving from a planned economy toward an open 
market. When such events occur, certain former institutions tend to disintegrate while 
new institutions begin to take shape. This typically, however, does not occur quickly. 
Instead, “meso-institutions,” the bridges that hold together element of the old with 
elements of new institutions are themselves “weak, intermediate forms of institutions that 
bridge the gap between institutional disintegration and the development of new, more 
firmly established institutions” (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007, p. 81). Similarly to the 
case of the Chinese economy discussed in Droege and Brown-Johnson’s (2007) research, 
the current institutional condition in Vietnam also provides an illustrative example of 
meso-institutions where weak bridges are all that are holding the old and the new 
together. 
Since Doi Moi (Reformation), the socialist-driven market reforms initiated in 
Vietnam in 1986, the Vietnamese economy has undergone a radical change from 
centrally planned to market oriented. Old regulations no longer effectively work in new 
situations and new institutions are under way to form new order for the society. Meso-
institutions, however, are not “in themselves change agents” but provide an environment 
for changes to take place with the goal of providing incentives for “institutional 
entrepreneurship” (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007, p. 83).  
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Droege and Brown-Johnson (2007, p. 93) elucidate meso-institutional 
characteristics including actions-as-rules and retrospective legitimization. The meso-
institutional characteristic of actions-as-rules suggests that rather than having 
“institutions give stability to actions, it is actions that give stability and meaning to 
institutions.” The institutional rules of the game (North, 1990) are built through the many 
trials and errors of meso-institutional experiments whether or not such experimentation is 
or is not intentional. Experimentation provides the benefit of allowing actions and 
resultant rules to become more in tune with reality. Formal institutionalization is 
legitimized post hoc by formal power holders as results are known, lessening risk to 
power holders while passing on risk to institutional entrepreneurs in a dialectic and 
recursive process of retrospective legitimization (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007). The 
drawback, however, is that leaders might be perceived as vacillating for their reluctance 
in implementing new rules prior to allowing unwitting institutional entrepreneurs to 
“piecemeal” actions and institutions together. These power-holding decision makers, on 
the other hand, gain the advantage of knowing the results of the regulatory institutional 
decisions before making any moves (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007).  
The present research is concerned with how microentrepreneurs’ perception of 
these two meso-institution characteristics—actions-as-rules and retrospective 
legitimization—affects microentrepreneurs’ intent to exit their business. Researchers 
have shown that economic, regulatory, and legal institutions play an important role in 
entrepreneurial activities and economic development and that institutions can either 
constrain or support various economic activities (Hayton et al., 2002). For example, 
according to Manolova, Eunni, and Gyoshev’s study (2008), institutional environments 
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were deemed relatively unfavorable in Latvia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, yet there were still 
microentrepreneurs present in these institutionally hostile environments. What is not 
known, however, is how many more microentrepreneurs might have contributed to 
economic growth had institutions been more malleable toward microentrepreneurs. In 
this research, we are interested in discovering whether there are relationships between 
perception of institutions and microentrepreneurs’ intent to get out of business. We thus 
hypothesize that: 
H1: The likelihood of microentrepreneurial intent to quit will be lower as 
perceptions of actions-as-rules among microentrepreneurs increase.  
H2: The likelihood of microentrepreneurial intent to quit will lessen as 
perceptions of retrospective legitimization increase. 
Addressing the problem of multi-level institutional change that has been discussed 
in recent studies (Seo & Creed, 2002), Droege and Marvel (2010) proposed two process 
mechanisms to help explain the link between institutional entrepreneurial participation 
and institutional change. Specifically, they are interested in how institutional 
entrepreneurial action results in diminished utility of regulatory controls and creates 
negotiated boundaries of institutional space. Diminished utility of regulatory controls is 
particularly salient to the present study and is defined as “a condition in which 
institutions lack sufficient strength to guide collective action” (Droege & Marvel, 2010). 
Although former institutions might regain control under conditions of social disorder, 
diminished utility of regulatory controls allows collective actions to guide the creation of 
more effective institutions, or a “controlled chaos” type of situation (Droege & Brown-
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Johnson, 2007). In this study, we investigate whether the perception of diminished utility 
of regulatory controls affects the intent to quit a business. 
 Because diminished utility of administrative controls is counterintuitive to 
traditional schema of institutions as guides of social order (e.g., Scott, 2008), applying 
this construct in the context of microentrepreneurship is particularly appropriate. 
Especially given that (1) the microentrepreneurial street vendors in our sample operate in 
the gray market of the economy and (2) recent Vietnamese regulations designed to clean 
the streets of street vendors are beginning to be enacted, we question whether 
microentrepreneurs’ intent to quit may be shaped by these recent actions. On the other 
hand, if regulatory controls are indeed diminished and actions-as-rules have more power 
to guide social action than formal regulatory institutions, we hypothesize: 
H3: The likelihood of microentrepreneurial intent to quit will lessen as 
perceptions of diminished utility of administrative controls increase. 
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METHODS 
Survey Design and Methods 
The survey was originally developed in English and was then translated into 
Vietnamese (Survey copies, in English and Vietnamese, are available in Appendix). We 
drew on the available literature for the independent variables of actions-as-rules, 
retrospective legitimization (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007), and diminished utility of 
administrative controls (Droege & Marvel, 2010). Because the literature regarding our 
dependent variables of intent to quit a business was sparse, we relied on our experience 
living and working in Vietnam to develop the dependent variables. 
After developing multiple possible survey items for each construct, we used 
exploratory factor analysis via principle components analysis using varimax rotation to 
uncover the structure of the items via data from a pilot study of 66 Vietnamese street 
vendors. We first used principal components analysis to determine the loadings of each 
item on each extracted factor.  The loadings were then rotated using Varimax rotation. 
The factor analysis is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Survey Item Factor Loadings 
  Component 
  1 2 3 
Diminished Utility of Regulatory Control 
1. Regulations will never stop street vending. 0.831     
2. As rural to urban migration increases, the number of street vending 
will also increase. 
0.764     
3. I would continue to be a street vendor even if the government tells 
me to quit. 
0.684     
4. It is more important to earn a living than to follow regulations. 0.591     
Actions As Rules 
5. Street vending regulations are ambiguous.   0.749   
6. Street vending is only temporarily stopped when the police come in 
but then continues once the police leave. 
  0.678   
7. In the future, there will be zones where street vendors are allowed 
and there will be zones where street vendors are not allowed. 
  0.611   
8. People are still selling on streets regardless of regulations against 
street vending. 
  0.555   
Retrospective Legitimization 
9. Restrictions on street vending will be reversed if they are unpopular 
among street vendors' customers. 
    0.811 
10. As long as my vending does not generate a crowd, the police will 
leave me alone.  
    0.575 
11. If street vending increases employment rates, lawmakers will likely 
make street vending legal.  
    0.559 
12. Regulations restricting street vending will be changed if current 
regulations have little effect on street vending activities.  
    0.531 
* Indicates Chronbach’s alpha >0.531 (Range = .531 - .831. 
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We subsequently ran stepwise multiple regression to simultaneously test and 
model multiple independent variables.  
Data Collection and Sample  
Our sample consisted of 660 street vendors in Vietnam to determine whether a 
relationship exists between street vendors’ perception of meso-institutions characteristics 
and their intentions to engage in increased or decreased microentrepreneurial activities or 
to switch to other services or sectors. Data were collected in four Vietnamese cities: 
Hanoi, Hue, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City. These are among the largest cities in 
Vietnam. Compared to street vending in rural areas, many street vendors reported that 
they made more money in the urban areas despite the problems they would have to face. 
This phenomenon led us to create one dependent variable addressing whether street 
vendors intend to return to the rural areas if that was where they were from.  
A survey team with research and data collection experience carried out the data 
collection process to help ensure the credibility of the data. Table 2 shows summary 
demographic data of our respondents.  
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Table 2: Summary Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
 
Description of the 
Item Number 
Percentage 
(N=660) 
Gender   
Male 182 27.58% 
Female 478 72.42% 
Age   
<20 21 3.18% 
20-29 117 17.73% 
30-39 251 38.03% 
40-49 177 26.82% 
50-59 62 9.39% 
>=60 32 4.85% 
Education   
None 83 12.58% 
Elementary 275 41.67% 
Secondary 247 37.42% 
High School 51 7.73% 
College and Higher 4 0.61% 
City   
Ha Noi 20 3.03% 
Hue 20 3.03% 
Da Nang 222 33.64% 
Ho Chi Minh City 398 60.30% 
Experience   
<1 year 64 9.70% 
1-5 years 275 41.67% 
5-10 years 202 30.61% 
>10 years 119 18.03% 
Income Level (compared to 
average)  
More 31 4.70% 
Less 437 66.21% 
About the same 192 29.09% 
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As can be seen from the summary in Table 2, the majority of street vendors in 
Vietnam are female. They make up about 72.42% of the total number of respondents. Most 
street vendors are reported to be between 20 and 50 years old. About one third is in the 30s. 
As several studies have pointed out (Jensen & Peppard, 2007), most vendors do not acquire 
much formal education. About 13% never attended school. Meanwhile, almost half of vendors 
on streets just finished elementary school; very few completed high school, and not even 1% 
went to college. On the contrary, according to The Street Vendor Project (2006), about 43% of 
street vendors in New York City had a college education or higher. Most Vietnamese vendors 
have been on streets for about 1 to 5 years. About one-fifth has street selling experience of 10 
years or more. When asked about income level, the majority (66.21%) said they earned 
less than the average worker in the city. Only about 5% thought their incomes were higher 
than the average income level in Vietnam.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3. As can be seen from the table, the 
majority of street vendors intended to continue street vending in the future even if the 
political and business environment might not be favorable for them. Descriptive statistics 
show a mean of 4.28 and a median of 5 (1 denotes totally disagree and 5 totally agree) for 
intent to continue street vending. Besides, if the government prohibited street vending, most 
street vendors believed they were more likely to be unemployed than to successfully find 
another job in other sectors. Mean values show that most street vendors surveyed did not intend 
to forsake their business in the cities to find jobs in other sectors or go back to their hometown. 
Besides, correlations matrix is presented in Table 4. The summary tells that 
multicollinearity is not a problem as all correlations show values of less than .7. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
INT1 660 4 1 5 4.28 1.181 
INT2 660 4 1 5 3.19 1.537 
INT3 660 4 1 5 2.40 1.529 
INT4 660 4 1 5 1.79 1.256 
INT5 660 4 1 5 1.90 1.306 
INT6 660 4 1 5 4.02 1.421 
AAR 660 4.00 1.00 5.00 3.8947 1.10930 
RL 660 4.00 1.00 5.00 3.6899 0.99220 
DU 660 4.00 1.00 5.00 4.2408 0.74786 
 
INT1: Intent to continue street vending 
INT2: Intent to find a permanent location 
INT3: Intent to find a job in another sector 
INT4: Intent to go back to hometown and start a new business 
INT5: Intent to go back to hometown and find a job in another sector 
INT6: Think that they would be unemployed 
AAR: Actions as rules 
RL: Retrospective legitimization 
DU: Diminished utilities of regulatory control 
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 Table 4: Coefficient Correlations 
Correlations 
 AAR RL DU INT1 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5 INT6 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .085* .102** .315** -.144** -.248** -.144** -.181** .122** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .030 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 
AAR 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.085* 1.000 .089* .044 .164** -.037 .062 .091* .164** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .030 . .022 .258 .000 .345 .113 .019 .000 
RL 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.102** .089* 1.000 .214** -.079* -.093* -.119** -.194** .126** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .022 . .000 .044 .017 .002 .000 .001 
DU 
N 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.315** .044 .214** 1.000 -.168** -.306** -.276** -.328** .220** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .258 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
INT1 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.144** .164** -.079* -.168** 1.000 .340** .084* .095* -.049 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .044 .000 . .000 .031 .015 .211 
INT2 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.248** -.037 -.093* -.306** .340** 1.000 .237** .232** -.137** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .345 .017 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
INT3 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.144** .062 -.119** -.276** .084* .237** 1.000 .772** -.222** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .113 .002 .000 .031 .000 . .000 .000 
Spearman's 
rho 
INT4 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
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Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.181** .091* -.194** -.328** .095* .232** .772** 1.000 -.245** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .019 .000 .000 .015 .000 .000 . .000 
INT5 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.122** .164** .126** .220** -.049 -.137** -.222** -.245** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000 .001 .000 .211 .000 .000 .000 . 
 
INT6 
N 660 660 659 660 660 660 660 660 660 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression results support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2; that is, street 
vendors’ perception of actions as rules and diminished utility of regulatory controls are 
statistically significant in predicting their intention to continue street vending (p < 0.0001 
for both variables). In the INT1 Model Summary from Table 5, it is shown that intent to 
continue street vending can be predicted by perception of actions as rules and diminished 
utilities of regulatory control. The output reveals that 9.5% of the variance in the intent to 
give up a business can be explained by the regression on perception of actions as rules; 
when data about perception of diminished utilities is added, they together explain 11.6% 
of the variance in the intention. The Sig. column from the Coefficients table for INT1 
again tells that both actions as rules and diminished utilizes are significant as predictors 
of intent to continue their business. Also, because these independent variables are 
significant, 0’s are not found between the lower and upper bounds for 95% confidence 
interval for B’s. It can also be interpreted from the table that as perception of actions as 
rules increases, the intent to continue business increases or in other words, intent to quit 
street vending decreases. The same logic applies to perceptions of diminished utility of 
regulatory control when the variable is added in model 2.  
Intent to settle down at a permanent location scores are regressed on three 
independent variables; only retrospective legitimization and actions as rules show 
statistical significance. In the first model from INT2 Model Summary, the result reveals 
that 1.9% of the variance in this intent is explained by perception of retrospective 
legitimization. When perception of actions as rules is added in model 2, these two 
predictors account for approximately 2.6% of the variance in street vendors’ intention to 
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find a permanent location for their businesses. Perception of diminished utilities is not 
statistically significant in predicting this intention. In addition, it is worth noticing that 
perception of retrospective legitimization positively correlates with the intent to vend at a 
legal permanent location or in other words, to quit roaming in streets (Beta= .153). 
Meanwhile, this intent among street vendors has a negative correlation with their 
perception of actions as rules. Therefore, as perception of actions as rules increases, 
intent to find a permanent spot, or in other words quit street vending, decreases.  
It is shown from the INT3 Model Summary that only perception of actions as 
rules is statistically significant in explaining the variance in the intent to find jobs in other 
sectors in the cities (R Square= 4.3%). In INT4 Model Summary, the predictor of actions 
as rules explains for about 1.5% of the variance in intent to go back to hometown and 
establish a new business. When data about perception of retrospective legitimization is 
added, the two together explains for 2.7% of the variance in this intent. Similar to INT2 
Model Summary, statistics shows a negative correlation between perception of actions as 
rules and intent to quit street vending in the cities and a positive correlation between 
perception of after the fact legitimization and intent to go home. Moreover, it is worth 
noting from INT5 Model Summary that the three independent variables are significant in 
explaining street vendors’ intent to go back to their hometown and find a job in another 
sector. About 2.5% of the variance is predicted by the most significant variable: 
diminished utilities of regulatory control. When perception of actions as rules is added, 
4.6% of the variance is explained. When the intent to find another job in hometown is 
regressed on the three variables, 6.2% of the variance cane be predicted by the three 
variables. Besides, it is shown from the Beta column in INT5 Coefficients that actions as 
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rules and diminished utilities of regulatory control are negatively correlated while 
retrospective legitimization is, however, positively correlated with the intent to quit street 
vending and go back to hometown and find jobs in other industries. Hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2, therefore, are supported from the results found in the different multiples 
regression models.  
Regarding thoughts about the likelihood of being unemployed if the government 
put a complete ban on street vending, it is showed in INT6 Model Summary that the three 
factors are statistically significant in predicting their thoughts about unemployment. 
Actions as rules alone explained 1.8% of the variance in the belief about unemployment; 
when retrospective legitimization is added, the two accounts for 3.6% of the variance; 
when the intent is regressed on all three independent variables, 4.1% of its variance is 
explained.  
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Table 5: Regression Results 
INT1 Model Summaryc 
Change Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .310a .096 .095 1.124 .096 69.960 1 657 .000  
2 .344b .118 .116 1.111 .022 16.379 1 656 .000 1.573 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, DU 
c. Dependent Variable: INT1 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
(Constant) 2.992 .160  18.715 .000 2.678 3.306    1 
AAR .330 .039 .310 8.364 .000 .253 .408 .310 .310 .310 
(Constant) 2.050 .281  7.287 .000 1.497 2.602    
AAR .316 .039 .297 8.059 .000 .239 .393 .310 .300 .295 
2 
DU .235 .058 .149 4.047 .000 .121 .350 .176 .156 .148 
a. Dependent Variable: INT1 
 
INT2 Model Summaryc 
Change Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .145a .021 .019 1.521 .021 14.033 1 657 .000  
2 .171b .029 .026 1.516 .008 5.666 1 656 .018 1.319 
a. Predictors: (Constant), RL 
b. Predictors: (Constant), RL, AAR 
c. Dependent Variable: INT2 
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Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
(Constant) 2.364 .228  10.358 .000 1.916 2.812    1 
RL .224 .060 .145 3.746 .000 .106 .341 .145 .145 .145 
(Constant) 2.814 .296  9.514 .000 2.234 3.395    
RL .236 .060 .153 3.950 .000 .119 .353 .145 .152 .152 
2 
AAR -.127 .053 -.092 -2.380 .018 -.232 -.022 -.079 -.093 -.092 
a. Dependent Variable: INT2 
 
INT3 Model Summaryb 
Change Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .207a .043 .042 1.497 .043 29.494 1 657 .000 1.501 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR 
b. Dependent Variable: INT3 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
(Constant) 3.511 .213  16.492 .000 3.093 3.929    1 
AAR -.285 .053 -.207 -5.431 .000 -.389 -.182 -.207 -.207 -.207 
a. Dependent Variable: INT3 
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INT4 Model Summary 
Change Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .122a .015 .013 1.249 .015 9.844 1 657 .002 
2 .164b .027 .024 1.242 .012 8.234 1 656 .004 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, RL 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) 2.325 .178  13.091 .000 1.976 2.674 1 
AAR -.138 .044 -.122 -3.138 .002 -.224 -.051 
(Constant) 1.849 .242  7.630 .000 1.373 2.325 
AAR -.148 .044 -.131 -3.390 .001 -.234 -.062 
2 
RL .140 .049 .111 2.869 .004 .044 .237 
a. Dependent Variable: INT4 
 
INT5 Model Summary 
Change Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .158a .025 .023 1.291 .025 16.815 1 657 .000 
2 .213b .046 .043 1.279 .021 14.173 1 656 .000 
3 .249c .062 .058 1.269 .016 11.443 1 655 .001 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DU 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DU, AAR 
c. Predictors: (Constant), DU, AAR, RL 
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Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) 3.074 .290  10.603 .000 2.504 3.643 1 
DU -.276 .067 -.158 -4.101 .000 -.408 -.144 
(Constant) 3.638 .324  11.235 .000 3.002 4.274 
DU -.253 .067 -.145 -3.782 .000 -.385 -.122 
2 
AAR -.170 .045 -.144 -3.765 .000 -.258 -.081 
(Constant) 3.128 .355  8.818 .000 2.432 3.825 
DU -.270 .067 -.154 -4.048 .000 -.400 -.139 
AAR -.182 .045 -.154 -4.051 .000 -.270 -.094 
3 
RL .170 .050 .129 3.383 .001 .071 .268 
a. Dependent Variable: INT5 
 
INT6 Model Summary 
Change Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .141a .020 .018 1.395 .020 13.377 1 657 .000 
2 .189b .036 .033 1.385 .016 10.730 1 656 .001 
3 .204c .041 .037 1.382 .006 3.909 1 655 .048 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, RL 
c. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, RL, DU 
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Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) 3.328 .198  16.771 .000 2.938 3.717 1 
AAR .179 .049 .141 3.657 .000 .083 .275 
(Constant) 2.722 .270  10.073 .000 2.191 3.252 
AAR .165 .049 .130 3.389 .001 .070 .261 
2 
RL .179 .055 .126 3.276 .001 .072 .286 
(Constant) 2.175 .386  5.628 .000 1.416 2.933 
AAR .157 .049 .124 3.217 .001 .061 .253 
RL .171 .055 .121 3.130 .002 .064 .278 
3 
DU .143 .073 .076 1.977 .048 .001 .286 
a. Dependent Variable: INT6 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Regression results strongly support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. They give 
evidence for the negative correlations between perceptions of actions as rules and 
diminished utilities of regulatory control and intent to quit micro-entrepreneurial venture 
among street vendors in Vietnam. According to Dreoge and Brown-Johnson’s theory of 
meso-institutions (2007, p. 91), actions serve as “rule makers” and institutions 
“followers” in transition economies.  It is the actions that give stability to institutions 
rather than institutions giving stability to actions. Results from our survey of 
microentrepreneurial street vendors in Vietnam reveal that as their perception that actions 
are becoming the de facto rules, microentrepreneurs’ intent to exit their business 
decreases.   
Vietnamese businesses have recently faced increasing regulations in attempts to 
control their activities. These regulations, although are intended to better the community 
as stated by the government (The People Committee of Da Nang City, 2006), do not 
reflect the wishes of the majority of Vietnamese street vendors. One vendor put it: “I’m 
used to selling on streets. I don’t know what I would do without my street vending. 
Nobody is going to hire me.” Another added: “I will street vend till my feet can't move 
anymore.” Our study finds that as street vendor’s perception of actions as rules increases, 
their intent to continue their business also increases. As street vendors perceive that 
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potential new regulations supporting street vending and based on social actions could 
replace old ones, they would be more likely to remain in the business.  
Similarly, the survey results show a positive correlation between perception of 
diminished utilities of regulatory control and microentrepreneur’s intent to quit their 
business. One street vendor noted: “If I get caught, I will just pay the fines and continue 
to street vend because my whole family rely on my income.” Regulatory controls, as 
inferred from street vendors’ responses, although do affect their business, do not have 
much power to prevent these microentrepreneurs from continue their business. These 
regulations, in fact, do not have practical implication.  
Our second hypothesis about the relationship between perception of retrospective 
legitimization and intent to quit a business, however, is not supported by regression 
results. Multiple regression reveals positive correlation between street vendors’ 
perception of legitimization after the fact and their intent to abandon their vending. This 
could be explained by the distinct socialist political system in Vietnam where the rules 
are most of the time created without the will of the people. Although street vendors hoped 
that their persistent resistance to follow street vending rules can lead to the changes in 
government policies, they were not very optimistic about new regulations emerging from 
social actions. Dreoge and Johnson-Brown has mentioned the risk of retrospective 
legitimization undermining existing authorizes “because it may imply leaders are reactive 
or indecisive” (2007, p. 96).  
Results from the survey in Vietnam have helped confirm two of our prepositions 
in the relationships between perceptions of meso-institutions and entrepreneurial intent to 
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quit business. Our study, however, is subjective to several limitations. First, our data 
come from snowball sampling of street vendors in Vietnam, which is not representative 
of the whole street vendor population. A cross study would provide us with a more 
comprehensive set of data. Besides, street vendors are only a part of what makes up 
microentrepreneurs as Rojas and Siga defines “own-account workers and owners of firms 
with less than 16 employees” (2009, p. 2667). These limitations have prevented us from 
making a decent generalizability of our study.  
Our study has implications for microentrepreneurship theory and public policy. 
We try to explore the most ignored part of entrepreneurship and microentrepreneurship 
fields: intent to quit business. Most entrepreneurship studies are centered in 
entrepreneurial intent to start a new venture; very little research is carried out on the other 
end of the subject where entrepreneurs have to think about giving up business because of 
the unfavorable institutional factors. We find a statistically significant correlation 
between microentrepreneurial perception of actions as rules and microentrepreneurial 
intent to quit a business. We also find that as perception of diminished utilities of 
regulatory control increases, intent to exit a business decreases. Future research could go 
further to generalize the findings on a cross-country study or expand to other micro 
business activities. Research about the fractured ideology factor in meso-institution 
theory also needs to be extensively studied to see if it has any important roles in 
entrepreneurial intent to quit a business. Studies to explain the unconformity of 
retrospective legitimization to the theory of meso-institutions are also needed.  
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Vietnamese street vendors are facing more problems than they were before 
because of new regulations restricting the activities for the many reasons discussed in 
earlier sections. Stricter street vending regulations once implemented will force many 
street vendors out of their only means of income, which consequently raises 
unemployment rate. A number of street vendors admitted that they would be sure 
unemployed if they were not allowed to vend on streets. Among the many reason that 
they stated were their inadequate education and lack of funds to rent a permanent 
location. “I depend on my vending for my income,” one street vendor told us. Another 
added:” My family relies on my vending. My kids' education relies on my vending. I can't 
imagine my family without my vending.” One of the major effects of stricter street 
vending regulations, therefore, is their influence on street vendors’ livelihood. Besides, 
ban on street vending will adversely affect consumers who are used to and prefer street 
buying rather any other kinds of modern shopping. Street vending is also a valuable piece 
of Vietnamese culture. It is what makes a trip to Vietnam more appealing to a large 
number of foreign travelers. A post on southeastasianfood.about.com started with the 
phrase:”A trip to Vietnam is not complete without tasting the street food” (Sim, n.d., 
para.1). Travelers Eckhardt and Hagerman also wrote about street food in South East 
Asia: “if you haven't experienced SE Asian street food, … you've missed out on an 
important part of the region's culinary culture” (Eckhardt & Hagerman, 2007, para. 3). In 
addition, if street vendors are forced out of work, they will be potentially involved in gray 
or black market activities. Since these people do not have the resources to do otherwise, 
they are vulnerable to taking part in other illegal business activities. Besides, “social 
vices might increase if ban is put on street vending” as one vendor shared her thoughts. ” 
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If the government put a ban on street vending, I think I would end up being a street 
beggar or a theft,” another vendor rhetorically said.  
We, therefore, propose the following solutions. First, if lawmakers see the 
potential of street vending interfering with the development of modern cities, their 
regulations should phase in period rather than be implemented rapidly. Vocational 
educational education opportunities should also be provided to street vendors to provide 
them with the necessary skills to find other jobs. Besides, street vendors that are over 60 
year old (4.85% of the total street vendors surveyed) should be given a helping hand in 
finding a place where they can be taken care of for the rest of their lives. Also, we 
recommend that street vendors be treated like real entrepreneurs. Zones for street vending 
should be extended and defined clearly. Street vending should be legally protected and 
taxes are collected in these areas. A number of street vendors revealed that they were 
willing to pay taxes as long as the government let them street vend. In addition, there 
should be an organization to protect street vendors’ rights. A big number of street 
vendors confessed that they did not understand all the regulations that have direct effects 
on them. “When the police approach, I just run away. I do not know whether I am wrong 
or not”, one street vendor told us.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have sought to explore the relationships between meso-
institutional elements and the intent to quit business among microentrepreneurs. We have 
found a statistically significant relationship between actions as rules and street vendor’s 
intent to give up their businesses. As their perception of actions as rules increases, their 
intent to quit a business decreases. Besides, results suggest a negative correlation between 
perception of diminished utilities of regulatory control and intent to exit business. 
Contrary to what we hypothesized, retrospective legitimization, however, does not 
negatively correlate with microentrepreneurs’ intent to quit their business. Given the 
changing institutional environment in Vietnam, we find this study of relative importance 
to the survival of vendors alongside streets in big cities in Vietnam. Some street vendors 
asked us if this survey served them any good; we are in great hope that this paper will be 
of considerable value for policy makers in Vietnam.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Western Kentucky University 
A Leading American University with International Reach 
 
 
Survey of Vietnamese Street Vendors 
The purpose of this survey is to better understand the challenges of running a street 
vending business. Your expertise is highly valued and will help us become more aware of 
some of the difficulties you and other street vendors encounter. 
Your answers are completely confidential. The researchers are the only ones who will see 
the surveys. Surveys from a large number of street vendors will be combined in the final 
report. The final report will not identify any individual street vendors to be certain that 
your answers are completely confidential. 
If you would like a copy of the final report, please contact the principal investigator, Mai 
Tran, using the following contact information. 
       
Mai Tran 
169/1 Tran Phu, Da Nang 
(0511) 3827578 
mai.tran189@wku.edu 
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 Part A: Please indicate the degree to which you 
agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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1. Regulations will never stop street vending. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. As rural to urban migration increases, the number of 
street vending will also increase. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I would continue to be a street vendor even the 
government tells me I must quit. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. It is more important to earn a living than to follow 
regulations.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Restrictions on street vending will be reversed if they 
are unpopular among street vendors’ customers. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. As long as my vending does not generate a crowd, the 
police will leave me alone. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. If street vending increases employment rates, 
lawmakers will likely make street vending legal. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Existing regulations restricting street vending will be 
changed if they have little effect on street vending 
activities. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Street vending regulations are ambiguous. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Street vending is only temporarily stopped when the 
police come in but then continues once the police 
leave. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. In the future there will be zones where street vendors 
are allowed and there will be zones where street 
1 2 3 4 5 
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vendors are not allowed. 
 
12. People are still selling on the streets regardless of 
regulations against street vending. 
 
In the future,  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I will continue street vending. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I will find a permanent location for my business. 1 2 3 4 5 
  
15. I will find another job in the city. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I will return to my hometown and start a new business. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. I will return to my hometown and find a job in another 
sector. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. If the government prohibits street vending, I will be 
unemployed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Others.      
 (Please 
specify)_________________________________ . 
     
 
Part B: Please provide additional information about you. 
1. Is this place your only location? 
_____ Yes _____ No 
 
2. Are you male or female? 
_____ Male _____ Female 
 
3. How old are you?  
 
 
_____ Less than 20 
_____ 20 – 29 
_____ 30 – 39 
_____ 40 – 49 
_____ 50 – 59 
_____ 60 or more
  
4. What is your highest level of formal education?  
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_____ None 
 _____ Elementary 
 _____ Secondary 
 _____ High School 
 _____ College 
 _____ Higher 
 
 
5. Where do you live now? 
_____ Ha Noi  
_____ Hue  
_____ Da Nang      
_____ Ho Chi Minh City 
 
6. How long have you been street vending? 
_____ Less than 1 year 
_____ 1 – 5 years 
_____ 5 – 10 years 
_____ More than 10 years 
 
7. Do you believe you are making more, less, or about the same as the average 
person in your city? 
_____ More  
_____ Less    
_____ About the same 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Western Kentucky University 
A Leading American University with International Reach 
 
 
Nghiên Cứu về Người Bán Hàng Rong và Vỉa Hè ở Việt Nam 
Mục đích của bài khảo sát này là để hiểu rõ hơn những thử thách của việc kinh doanh 
hàng rong và vỉa hè ở Việt Nam. Những ý kiến đóng góp của anh/chị sẽ giúp chúng tôi 
hiểu rõ hơn về những khó khăn mà anh/chị và những người buôn bán hàng rong khác gặp 
phải. 
Câu trả lời của anh/chị sẽ được giữ hoàn toàn bí mật. Những người nghiên cứu là những 
người duy nhất tiếp cận kết quả khảo sát. Kết quả thu được sẽ được tóm tắt trong một bản 
báo cáo tổng kết chính thức. Bản báo cáo chính thức sẽ không tiết lộ thông tin cá nhân 
người tham gia khảo sát. 
Nếu anh/chị muốn tham khảo bản báo cáo chính thức, xin vui lòng liên hệ Trần Nhật Mai 
theo những thông tin sau: 
Trần Nhật Mai 
169/1 Trần Phú, Đà Nẵng 
(0511) 3827578 
mai.tran189@wku.edu 
45 
 
 
 
A. Xin anh/chị hãy cho biết ý kiến về những ý sau 
đây. (Đánh dấu vào câu trả lời tương ứng) 
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1. 
 
Quy định về hạn chế hàng rong cũng không chấm dứt 
được buôn bán hàng rong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Nếu người nhập cư từ nông thôn lên thành phố tăng lên, 
số lượng người bán hàng rong cũng sẽ tăng lên. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Tôi vẫn sẽ tiếp tục buôn bán hàng rong ngay cả khi chính 
quyền bắt tôi phải bỏ nghề. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Theo tôi, kiếm sống quan trọng hơn là tuân theo những 
quy định. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Những quy định ngăn cấm buôn bán hàng rong sẽ bị bãi 
bỏ nếu người dân không ủng hộ. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Công an sẽ không can thiệp việc buôn bán của tôi nếu 
gian hàng của tôi không làm tụ tập đám đông gây mất 
trật tự. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Nếu buôn bán hàng rong giúp tạo thêm việc làm, nhà 
nước sẽ cho phép hàng rong trở thành hợp pháp. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Những quy định hiện tại về hạn chế hàng rong sẽ được 
thay đổi vì nó không ảnh hưởng nhiều đến hoạt động 
buôn bán hàng rong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Những quy định về buôn bán hàng rong còn mơ hồ đối 
với tôi. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 Ở một số nơi, buôn bán hàng rong chỉ tạm thời dừng khi 
công an can thiệp, nhưng sẽ lại tiếp tục khi công an bỏ 
đi. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 Trong tương lai sẽ có những khu vực mà buôn bán hàng 1 2 3 4 5 
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rong là hợp pháp và có những khu vực mà buôn bán hàng 
rong là bất hợp pháp. 
12 Ở một số nơi, hàng rong vẫn diễn ra bất chấp luật cấm. 
Trong tương lai,  
1 2 3 4 5 
13 Tôi vẫn sẽ tiếp tục bán hàng rong. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Tôi sẽ tìm một nơi buôn bán hơp pháp cố định. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Tôi sẽ tìm một việc khác trong thành phố. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Tôi sẽ về quê để buôn bán. 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Tôi sẽ về quê và tìm một công việc khác. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Nếu nhà nước cấm buôn bán hàng rong, tôi sẽ bị thất 
nghiếp.  
1 2 3 4 5 
19 Ý kiến khác.      
 (Xin vui lòng làm 
rõ)______________________________ . 
     
 
B. Xin vui lòng cung cấp thêm thông tin về anh/chị. (Đánh dấu vào câu trả lời 
tương ứng) 
 
1. Anh/chị chỉ buôn bán tại địa điểm này? 
_____ Đúng  
_____ Sai 
2. _____ Nam _____ Nữ 
3. Anh/chị bao nhiêu tuổi ? 
_____ Dưới 20 tuổi  _____ 40-49 tuổi  
_____ 20-29 tuổi   _____ 50-59 tuổi 
_____ 30-39 tuổi   _____ 60 tuổi trở lên 
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4. Trình độ học vấn chính quy cao nhất của anh/chị :  
_____ Không   _____ Cấp 3 
_____ Tiểu học  _____ Đại học 
_____ Cấp 2   _____ Trên đại học 
5. Anh/chị hiện đang ở : 
_____ Hà Nội   
_____ Huế  
_____ Đà Nẵng  
_____ TP Hồ Chí Minh 
6. Anh/chị đã bán hàng rong được bao lâu ?  
_____ Dưới 1 năm 
_____ 1-5năm 
_____ 5-10 năm 
_____ >10 năm 
7. Anh/chị nghĩ mình thu nhập cao hơn, thấp hơn, hay tương đương với mức trung bình 
của thành phố ? 
_____ Cao hơn  
_____ Thấp hơn    
_____ Tương đương 
 
Cảm ơn anh/chị rất nhiều ! 
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